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INTRODUCTION TO THE PRESENTATIONS: THE
PATH TO AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
MENTAL ILLNESS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Richard C. Dieter'
I would first like to congratulate the Columbus School of Law and the
Catholic University of America for sponsoring this important
Symposium. In particular, the editors of the Law Review deserve praise
for focusing on what is clearly a groundbreaking area of the law, and one
that we will be hearing more about in the not-too-distant future.
This Symposium occurs at the intersection of two critical developments
in our understanding of the law and human responsibility. On one road,
the Supreme Court and the country as a whole are in the midst of a re-
evaluation of the death penalty because of the mistakes and injustices
that have been revealed in recent years. Questions about innocence,
about who should be excluded from the death penalty, and what process
is due before such a sentence is imposed are being re-opened, after years
of appearing settled.'
At the same time, our understanding of the human mind and the
intricacies of mental illness is making enormous strides. Technology is
allowing us to look more deeply and precisely into the physiology of the
human brain.2 New drugs are altering human behavior in dramatic ways,
underscoring the chemical basis for what earlier was considered
immutable deviance. Today's Symposium takes place where this re-
evaluation of the death penalty crosses paths with the new insights into
mental illness.
Yet even as our discussions today break new ground, they also find
their roots in the law much further back in our country's history. I would
Professor Dieter is an Adjunct Faculty Member of the Columbus School of Law and is
the Executive Director of the Death Penalty Information Center in Washington, D.C.
1. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607-09 (2002) (finding a law requiring that
a judge, rather than a jury, determine the existence of aggravating factors
unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the death penalty
for the mentally retarded unconstitutional). On the issue of innocence, Justice John Paul
Stevens recently questioned the wisdom of the death penalty at the Seventh Circuit Bar
Association dinner in Chicago: "'We cannot ignore the fact that in recent years a
disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated."' Abdon M. Pallasch,
High Court Justice: U.S. Would Be Better Off Without Death Penalty, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
May 12, 2004, at 12.
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Brain Immaturity Could Explain Teen Crash Rate,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at Al (citing a study done by the National Institutes of Health
about growth in areas of the brain at different ages).
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like to briefly examine some of that history to help put today's topic in
context.
Thomas Jefferson was one of the first to underscore the importance of
adjusting our laws and updating our understanding of legal principles in
accord with the times in which we live. He did not see the Constitution
as unchangeably written in stone:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,
and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be
touched.... [L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and
keep pace with the times.3
Although Supreme Court decisions relying on the Eighth Amendment
were rare during most of the Court's history, the justices did show an
appreciation for Jefferson's advice when examining the cruelty of certain
sanctions. Prior to the early 1960s when the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,4 the Court found only two instances of legally sanctioned
punishments to be cruel and unusual. Neither involved the death
penalty, but both represented important milestones in the Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
In Weems v. United States,5 the Supreme Court overturned a sentence
of fifteen years of hard labor imposed on an officer in the Philippines
6
who had defrauded the federal government. Fifteen years in prison
would not have been considered a torturous punishment when the
Constitution was written, given that much harsher sentences were
allowable at that time. But rather than focus only on what would have
been outlawed in 1789, or on what was clearly a barbaric form of
punishment, the Court found that the punishment given Weems violated
the Eighth Amendment because the legislature had established a penalty
that was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.7
The Court signaled its progressive approach by declaring that the
Eighth Amendment should not be "fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 409 n.7 (1972) (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 40-42 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
4. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
5. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
6. Id. at 357-58, 382.
7. Id. at 382.
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justice."8 It examined the punishments administered for other crimes in
various jurisdictions and decided that the punishment given Weems was
particularly excessive.9
The second time the Court overturned a lawful sanction also provided
valuable insight into determining whether a punishment was cruel and
unusual. In Trop v. Dulles,'0 the Court considered the punishment of
expatriation for the crime of desertion." Trop had gone AWOL for one
day during his military service in World War 11.12 For this offense, he was
stripped of his U.S. citizenship.13  Again, the punishment was not
Draconian like being drawn and quartered, nor even as final as being
hung, which would have been permissible in the Constitution's early
days. Nevertheless, a plurality of the Court held that the punishment was
shocking by modern standards: it represented "the total destruction of
the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment
more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development.' 4 In arriving at this
judgment, the Court stated what has become the guiding principle for
interpreting the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment: it is
to be understood in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.""
The Court looked not only at the mores in the U.S. at that time, but
also at what punishments other countries applied in similar
circumstances. 6  The use of international norms in interpreting the
standards of decency that should apply continues in the Court's
jurisprudence to this day, 7 though not all of the justices would concur in
their relevance. 8
Once it was clearly established that the Eighth Amendment applied to
the states and that their application of capital punishment was subject to
such analysis, the number of Eighth Amendment judicial decisions
multiplied appreciably. Using this "standards of decency" approach, the
8. Id. at 378.
9. Id. at 375-82.
10. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
11. Id. at 87.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
15. Id. (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 102-03.
17. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing Brief of Amicus
Curiae European Union, Atkins (No. 00-8452)).
18. See id. at 324-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the use of international
standards).
11192005]
Catholic University Law Review
Court outlawed the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult,19 for
accomplices to murder where the defendant intended no bodily harm
and did not exhibit reckless indifference to human life, ° for the insane,2
for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime, 2 and for
the mentally retarded.23
It is Atkins v. Virginia24 that perhaps brings us closest to the issue we
are considering today. Here, the Court did not find that the punishment
of death was disproportionate to the heinous murder of which Atkins
had been convicted. Rather, as in Ford v. Wainwright25 and Thompson v.
Oklahoma,26 the punishment was excessive for this kind of defendant.21
After the death penalty was allowed to resume in 1976, the paradigm for
death sentencing was that it should only be applied to the worst
offenders. 8 Society had reached a consensus, as evidenced in laws and
declining death sentences for the mentally retarded, that those with
limited mental capacity are not among the worst offenders, regardless of
the seriousness of their crimes. The Supreme Court confirmed that
consensus under the protection of the Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment.
What we hope to explore today is whether defendants with mental
illness, or at least some definable subset of that group, also suffer from
mental limitations that should preclude society's ultimate sanction. If the
Court should address this issue in the future, it will not only examine the
neurological impulses and chemical deficiencies that may be present in
the mentally ill, but it will also examine society's response to such
knowledge. It will look for concrete legislation that has been passed to
protect the mentally ill, and it will analyze the actions of juries,
prosecutors, and judges in arriving at the appropriate sentences for such
29individuals convicted of capital murder.
19. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
20. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
21. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401, 417-18 (1986) (plurality opinion).
22. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
23. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
24. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
25. 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986) (plurality opinion).
26. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
27. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
28. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("[A]ggravating [factors] must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder.").
29. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 (assessing the actions of state legislatures and the
infrequency of the use of the death penalty for those with mental retardation).
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Outside the area of insanity, there is little legislation today protecting
the mentally ill from the death penalty. There is, however, evidence that
the public's standards are indeed evolving on this issue. The cases of
Andrea Yates and Deanna Laney in Texas, though disturbing for the fact
that the death penalty was considered for at least one of these seriously
ill mothers who killed her children, represent change because the death
penalty was not imposed in either case.30 On the whole, death sentences
are declining sharply around the country.3" Some governors have granted
clemencies because of the mental illness of the defendant. 3 I believe that
discussions such as this will become more common in the future and that
eventually state and federal legislation will emerge to provide the Court
with an objective basis for sparing the mentally ill from the death
penalty. I look forward to hearing from the experts on this important
subject.
30. Lisa Falkenberg, Two Child Killers, Two Verdicts, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 6,
2004, at A9.
31. See Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 2004, at 1, app. at 14 tbl.2, available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdflcpO3.pdf.
32. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CLEMENCY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did-126&scid-13 (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (clemencies granted with reasons
stated).
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